Dissociating language and thought in large language models
arxiv:2301.06627
Reasoning and the "physics" of language models · 2023-01-16
Complete cleaned Markdown · Source Markdown including bibliography
Read in parts
Contents
- Dissociating language and thought in large language models
- Abstract
- The language-thought conflation
- Formal vs. functional linguistic competence
- What does linguistic competence entail?
- Formal linguistic competence
- Functional linguistic competence
- Motivation for the distinction between formal vs. functional linguistic competence
- The language network supports language processing in the human brain
- The language network does not support non-linguistic cognition
- LLMs have largely mastered formal linguistic competence in English
- Statistical language models: some fundamentals
- Large language models learn core aspects of human language processing
- LLMs perform well on benchmarks of diverse linguistic phenomena
- LLMs learn hierarchical structure
- LLMs learn linguistic abstractions
- LLMs learn constructions
- LLMs are predictive of activity in the human language network
- Using LLMs as models of formal linguistic competence in humans
- Excessive reliance on statistical regularities
- Unrealistic amounts of training data
- Insufficient tests on languages other than English
- Non-augmented LLMs fall short on functional linguistic competence
- A. Fine-tuning on the task and the challenge of closed models
- B. Generalizable, robust performance
- Formal Reasoning
- World models 1: factual and commonsense knowledge
- World models 2: situation tracking
- Social reasoning
- Language input can bootstrap functional competence capabilities
- Toward models that use language like humans
- Concluding remarks
- Glossary
- Highlights
- Outstanding Questions
- Acknowledgements
- Funding Sources
- Conflicts of Interest